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CASE COMMENTS
Treating payments made by a feeder corporation to its parent
charitable foundation as constructive dividends rather than charitable
contributions is in accord with eleemosynary reality. The beneficial
ownership doctrine enunciated in Knapp Shoe disallows charitable
deductions for payments made by a feeder corporation to the entity
which possesses the economic interest and enjoyment of the feeder
corporation. The doctrine of beneficial enjoyment does not necessitate
judicial inquiry into either the motive for payments made by a feeder
corporation to its parent foundation, or as to who possesses the manag-
erial or operational control of the feeder corporation.
J. D. HUMPHRIES
TESTS OF CONTRACTUAL INTEGRATION
The parol evidence rule is an accepted rule of American law which
states that evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and
negotiations is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a later
written agreement which the parties have agreed is the total embodi-
ment of their understanding.' If the instrument is found to contain
the parties' complete understanding, then such an instrument is said
to be totally integrated.2 While the rule seems simple and straight-
forward, an examination of case law in this area will show the con-
fusion that actually exists. The problem is not the parol evidence rule
itself, but the antedecent determination of what method should be
followed in deciding whether the written instrument is totally inte-
grated.3 The resolution of this problem may lead to a decline of
the parol evidence rule itself.
A recent California decision, Masterson v. Sine,4 rejected the
traditional method of determining contractual intergration in favor
of a more flexible rule based on intent. In 1958 plaintiff-wife and her
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252,
255 (1939)-
13 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960); RLESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
-'An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or
writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement." RESrATEMIENT OF
CONTRACTS § 228 (1932).
3See the following cases for a discussion of the different methods of determin-
ing integration: Clark v. United States, 341 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1965); Brewood v.
Cook, 2G7 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Thompson v. Liddy, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N.W. 1
(x885); Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1966).
'436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
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husband deeded a ranch to the husband's sister and her spouse with
a stipulation which reserved for the grantors an option to repurchase
the property on or before February 25, 1968.5 Following the execution
of this deed, grantor-husband was adjudged bankrupt. Grantor-wife
and husband's trustee in bankruptcy sought a declaratory judgment to
allow them to exercise the option to repurchase. The grantees, how-
ever, claimed that there had been a contemporaneous oral agreement
between the parties that in order to keep the land in the family, this
repurchase option could be exercised only by the grantors personally
and was not assignable.0 The grantees further claimed that the written
deed did not contain their total agreement and, therefore, was not
an integrated instrument. Thus, the question for the court to de-
termine was what type of extrinsic evidence, if any, tending to show
the written deed was not the total agreement of the parties, should
have been admitted at the trial.
The majority in Masterson rejected the "four corners" doctrine
previously followed by the courts of that state7 and adopted the "rea-
sonable man" approach of the Restatement of Contracts.S Under this
theory, non-contradictory evidence as to what the parties intended is
admissible even though the instrument appears totally integrated on
its face, if the court determines under the circumstances a "reasonable
man" might naturally have included such a collateral oral agreement
as part of his total bargain. Masterson decided that a separate, oral
agreement which forbade the assignment of the grantor's repurchase
option might naturally have been made. As a factual determination,
the court found that the family was inexperienced in land tranactions.
Recognizing the difficulty of adapting collateral agreements to the
formalized structure of a deed, the court reasoned that the grantors'
right to repurchase from future purchasers would be protected by the
inclusion of the repurchase option in the deed; its non-assignability
might naturally be the subject of a separate agreement since the in-
5
1d. at 546.
6The trustee is not automatically vested with title where property and rights
of action could not have been freely transferred by the bankrupt. Bankruptcy
Act § 7o(a)(5), ii U.S.C. § 1io(a)(5) (1953).
7E.g., Thoroman v. David, 199 Cal. 386, 249 P. 513 (1926); Heffner v. Gross, 179
Cal. 738, 178 P. 860 (1919).
sThe Restatement provides:
An oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent or
contemporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a subsequent
integration relating to the same subject-matter, if the agreement is not
inconsistent with the integrated contract, and ... is such an agreement as
might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as
were the parties to the written contract.
RESTATEMIENT OF CONTRACTS § 240(1) (1932).
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clusion of the non-assignability clause in the deed would be un-
necessary to protect the grantors' rights as against those of future pur-
chasers. Fearing the effect this decision will have on both the reli-
ability of land conveyance instruments and the increased ability to
defraud creditors, the dissent condemned this departure from estab-
lished California law.
Throughout the opinion, Masterson noted the four different tests
used generally in determining whether extrinsic evidence tending to
show the non-existence of an integration is admissible: (i) the tradi-
tional "four corners" doctrine that was discarded in Masterson; (2) the
"reasonable man" standard of the Restatement of Contracts and Pro-
fessor Samuel Williston, which Masterson adopted; (3) the acutal
intent method of Professor Arthur Corbin; and (4) the recently pro-
mulgated test of the Uniform Commercal Code.
Under the "four corners" approach the question of a partial or
total integration can only be determined by looking at the face of the
instrumentP Extrinsic, non-contradictory evidence is admissible only to
clarify ambiguities or supply missing terms whose absence have made
the document on its face only partially integrated.10 Under this test
the court in Masterson would have disallowed evidence as to the non-
assignability of the repurchase option, for the deed on its face appeared
to be complete. Often a written agreement is deemed total on its face
by supplying missing terms by means of judicial inferences even
though these inferred terms may not have been the intent of either
party."l As expressed in Peterson v. Chaix:
[W]hatever the law implies from a contract in writing is as
much a part of the contract as that which is therein expressed;
and the extent that the contract, with that which the law
9Fox Midwest Theaters, Inc. v. Means, 221 F. 2d 173 (8th Cir. 1955); Armstrong
Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 3oi Ill. 102, 133 N.E. 711 (1921);
Marshall Hall Grain Co. v. P. H. Boyce Mercantile Co., 203 Mo. App. 220, 211
S.W. 725 (1919); Dawson County State Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605, 2o9 N.W.
243 (1926).
"Fawkner v. Lew Smith Wallpapering Co., 88 Iowa 169, 55 N.W. 200 (1893)
(dictum).
nFogler v. Purkiser, 127 Cal. App. 554, 16 P.2d 305 (1932); Union Special Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Lockwood, 11o Ill. App. 387 (1904); Blake Mfg. Co. v. Jaeger, 81
Mo. App. 239 (1899). See Masterson, supra note 4, at 549 n.3, for a criticism of
this approach. But also note that in Masterson, not even the dissent would follow
the device of using inferences to explain or supply missing contractual terms in
order to create an instrument integrated on its face and thus not subject to ex-
planatory, extrinsic evidence. On the contrary, the minority welcomes this type of
evidence to explain terms of the conveyance that seems ambiguous. 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 551.
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implies, is clear, definite and complete, it cannot be added to,
varied, or contradicted by extrinsic evidence. 12
Applying this doctrine, Liliengren Furniture 6- Lumber Co. v. Mead13
held that where a contract to deliver window sashes was silent as to
the time of delivery, the court would imply a reasonable time and
would forbid the introduction of evidence of an oral contemporaneous
agreement tending to prove that these sashes "were to be furnished and
delivered as fast as needed in the construction of the building."'14
The remaining three tests of contractual integration are based on
the parties' intent. It should be noted that regardless of which test
is used, all three are tools by which the judge passes on the credibility
of the evidence and thereby allows its submission to the trier of fact.
If evidence of the parties' intent is to be admitted, an important con-
sideration involves which intent of the parties is the goal of judicial
determination-their apparent intent or their subjective intent. A court
applying an apparent intent test is establishing a stricter credibility
standard than one using subjective intent. Masterson and other cases' 5
have adopted the apparent intent, "reasonable man" standard of the
Restatement of Contracts. Professor Samuel Williston's treatise on
contracts is in agreement.' 6 Williston would only admit evidence of
a non-contradictory,' 7 collateral agreement if a "reasonable man"
might have made such an agreement. Williston states, "The point is
not merely whether the court is convinced that the parties before it did
in fact [so agree], but whether parties so situated generally would or
might do so." Is While Williston claims to make his determination
based on the parties' apparent intent,' 9 it seems that a collateral, non-
contradictory oral agreement, made before any number of witnesses,
would be ineffective if parties so situated would not generally make
such oral agreement.
20
1 5 Cal. App. 525, 90 P. 948, 954 (1907).
242 Minn. 420, 44 N.W. 3o6 (189o).
24d. at 3o8.
"Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank,
159 Tex. I66, 317 S.W.2d 3o (1958). For a discussion of other problems concerning
the Restatement test, see 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 584 (196O).
"04 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 638 (3d ed. Jaeger g6i).
27The requirement that the collateral agreement be non-contradictory is itself
one of various credibility tests the court uses in making its initial determination.
"84 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 638 at 1041 (3 d ed. Jaeger j961).
14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 638 (3d ed. Jaeger ig6i).
"°See 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS §§ 633, 638 (3 d ed. Jaeger g6i). In Gianni v.
Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924), evidence of a collateral oral agreement
that plaintiff would have the exclusive soft drink concession in an office building in
consideration for his written agreement in the lease to refrain from selling tobacco
was excluded since the oral agreement would naturally and normally have been
included in the written contract.
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Williston argues that admission of all extrinsic evidence would
cripple the parol evidence rule since the "rule would then be of im-
portance only in establishing a presumption that prior and con-
temperaneous oral agreements and negotiations were merged in the
writing...21 Williston's reasonable man test first determines the
credibility, and, thereby, the admissibility, of extrinsic evidence. It
then sheds its status as an admissibility standard and in its more
common use is employed, among other tests, by the trier of fact to
determine if the evidence actually admitted is truthful.
A different approach is taken by Professor Arthur Corbin, who
advocates the application of the "actual" subjective intent of the
parties22 rather than the "reasonable man" standard of Williston and
the Restatement.23 He would admit evidence of a consistent agreement
even though it would be unnatural for a "reasonable man" to make
such an agreement. Corbin criticizes the Restatement approach claim-
ing that "whether or not it was 'natural' for the parties to do as they
did bears only on the credibility of the evidence offered."2 4 Corbin
would not be forced to reject an "unnatural" oral, collateral, non-con-
tradictory agreement made before a large number of witnesses as would
Williston. Evidence of the "unnatural" agreement would be admitted
if the judge deems it credible. The "reasonable man" standard would
be employed not as an absolute judicial admission standard, but
merely as an aid to the judge, among other tests, in determining the
credibility of the evidence sought to be admitted.
In United States v. Clementon Sewerage Authority,25 extrinsic evi-
dence of an oral agreement between the sewerage authority and the
designing engineer to limit the construction costs to a specified amount
was admissible in determining if the written contract was a total
integration even though "it is unusual to omit so important a term
from a writing as comprehensive as this one."2 6 If Masterson had fol-
lowed this "actual intent" approach, the result would have been
identical since there the majority found the collateral agreement to
"4 S. WImLisrON, COrRAcTs § 633 at 1014 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
22 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 582 (196o); Atlantic Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953) (extrinsic evidence as to the parties' circumstances and
actual intent is always admissible to aid the court in determining if there was a
partial or total integration).
"For a discussion of objective versus subjective intent as expressed by Williston
and Corbin, see Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a .Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and
Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333 (1967). Masterson briefly men-
tions the existence of this test, but offers no criticism or evaluation. 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 547.
213 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrs § 584 at 480 (1960).
-5365 F.,d 609 (3rd Cir. 1966) (decided according to New Jersey law).
211d. at 614.
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have been not only a natural intent of the parties so situated but also
the actual intent of the parties.
Another criterion for judging the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
is expressed in the Uniform Commercal Code § 2-202 where it is stated
that the written agreement: "[m]ay be explained or supplemented ...
by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement." Comment 3 to § 2-202 states:
[C]onsistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may be
proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended by
both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the
terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they
would certainly have been included in the document in the view
of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept
from the trier of fact.
2 7
The UCC standard is a two-fold judicial test of admissibility. The
court must first determine whether the parties intended their written
contract to represent their entire agreement. If the court finds that
the parties intended a consistent additional term to be part of their
written contract, it will then determine if this additional term was of
such a nature as might possibly not have been included in the written
instrument. Only when an affirmative decision is made under both
these tests and the evidence is thereby determined to be credible will
the trier of fact be permitted to consider the evidence.
Masterson takes the position that the UCC test is broader than
those of Williston and Corbin. The majority appears to reject this
broader rule while pointing out that had it followed the UCC test,
a fortiori, the holding would have been identical.2 While California
has enacted § 2-202 of the UCC as promulgated by the 1962 Official
Draft, § 2-102 applies Article II to "transactions in goods." 29 Although
the Code permits the application of Article II to non-sales situations,3 °
it certainly does not require its application. Thus California remains
free to adopt any test of contractual integration it wishes. In the
few cases interpreting this section of the Code, it has been used to
rUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comment 3 (emphasis added). The phrase
"consistent additional terms" is synonymous with "non-contradictory" evidence as
used by Williston and Corbin. Both phrases express a judicial credibility standard.
n'6 5 Cal. Rptr. at 549. Since the court held it was "natural" for the parties
to make this contemporaneous oral agreement it must also hold that parties would
not have "certainly" included this oral agreement in the written one.
nUNIFORNM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
5
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102, 2-313, Comment 2. For a complete
discussion of the application of the UCC as a judicial principle, see Note, The
Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
88o (1965).
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justify the admission of extrinsic evidence in a variety of commercial
situations.
Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner3 ' involved an uncondi-
tional written stock purchase option given to the plaintiff. While the
option seemed integrated and unconditional on its face, the court,
in denying a motion for summary judgement, admitted extrinsic
evidence to show that the option was not in fact an unlimited right.
Because the court only discussed the question of the consistency of
the option, it, by implication, must have previously reached the
conclusion that the document was not intended to be the total agree-
ment and that the option might possibly not have been included in
the writing. The court recognized that this additional term might
easily frustrate the ripening of the written agreement. Nevertheless,
citing UCC § 2-202, and UCC § 2-202, Comment 3, the court held the
oral agreement to be a "consistent additional" terms since "[t]o be
inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the writ-
ing."132 Therefore, a term which does not contradict or negate a term
of the writing is provable. Since the additional term was deemed
consistent by the court, it became a question for the trier of fact to
consider this additional evidence and to arrive at an ultimate determi-
nation of the actual agreement of the parties.8 3 Under this New York
ruling the additional evidence must specifically contradict or negate
a term of the written agreement before proof of its existence can be
excluded.34 Unlike the apparent and subjective standards of the Re-
statement and Corbin, reasonableness in general in making such a
collateral agreement is not considered by the court.
Masterson may be read as rejecting both the traditional "four
corners" and the UCC rules and instead adopting the "reasonable
man" approach of the Restatement of Contracts. Only the dissent
actually states that the Restatement of Contracts test has been adopted.
Nowhere, however, in the opinion is the broader UCC test specifically
rejected. Referring to the judicial doctrine of not formulating a
broader rule than is necessary to decide the controversy, 35 one could
3"26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
'id. at 940.
'In determining this agreement, the court does not specifically state which
intent is the goal of the trier of fact, but it seems certain that the court means
the actual, subjective intent of Corbin rather than the "reasonable man" intent
of Williston.
"See also Ciunci v. Wella Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966)
(extrinsic evidence limiting a release that appeared all inclusive on its face was
admitted as a consistent additional term).
"'Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
1968]
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easily imagine the California court formally adopting the UCC rule
if the Restatement rule were not broad enough to support the court's
desired result. Thus, the California court might admit evidence of an
oral agreement that a "reasonable man" would not naturally have
made the subject of a separate agreement if the court is convinced
such collateral negotiations actually occurred.
While the dissent condemns a more liberal admission standard, it
must be remembered that throughout the field of commercial law there
has been a loosening of requirements of form in order to better realize
the expectations and agreements of the parties involved.3 6 Although
the dissenting justices in Masterson "doubt that trial judges should
be burdened with the task of conjuring whether it would have been
'natural'," 37 it nevertheless seems that such a rule would further the
expectations of the parties more than would a blind rule of form.
However, the "reasonable man" rule adopted by Masterson does
not seem to be in accord with the modern trend. New York,38 Ten-
nessee,39 and Rhode Island,40 have expressly adopted the UCC stand-
ard. Furthermore, it has been predicted that the subjective intent
doctrine of Corbin will be followed by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.41 Corbin's actual intent standard seems to be the most
realistic and practical of the various rules in use today. By using the
"reasonable man" standard merely as one credibility test rather than as
an absolute exclusionary test, credible but "unnatural" evidence may
be admitted. Such evidence may then be tested as to its truthfulness by
the trier of fact using as one criteria the "reasonable man" standard.
The injustice of being forced to reject evidence of a widely witnessed
collateral bargain can be avoided without increasing the possibility of
fraud or collusion any more than exists under the Restatement "reason-
able man" view.
While none of the proposed admissibility tests directly affect the
operation of the parol evidence rule, they may indirectly control its
application. If there are such lenient credibility guidelines for ad-
mitting evidence to make the initial determinaion of the presence of a
total integration, as under the UCC and Corbin tests, then it would
seem that a greater number of such instruments would be termed
only partial integrations. Thus, the parol evidence rule would not
3UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
'65 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
'Ciunci v. Wella Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966).
3Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 415 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
"OSee Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington College, 98 R.I. 35, ig A.2d 586 (1964).
"Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles
of Contract InterpretatiOn, 42 IND. L.J. 333, 353 (1967).
